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We use data from the PSID to investigate how households' portfolio allocations change in response
to wealth fluctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate
time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the
proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast,
our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not affected
by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of households' portfolio allocation seems to be











Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA  94305
and NBER
nagel_stefan@gsb.stanford.edu1 Introduction
A growing number of studies in macroeconomics and ￿nance propose models in which
agents￿relative risk aversion is time-varying. The most popular approach is to use
habit-formation preferences, in particular di⁄erence habits, which imply that felicity is
a function of consumption minus a habit. In asset pricing, di⁄erence-habit models have
some success in reproducing the mean and counter-cyclicality of asset return risk premia
found in the data (Constantinides (1990); Bakshi and Chen (1996); Campbell and
Cochrane (1999)). In macroeconomics, habits help to jointly match stylized facts about
asset returns and the business cycle (see, e.g., Jermann (1998); Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001)). An alternative approach focuses on consumption commitments,
which can have e⁄ects similar to those of di⁄erence habits, in particular, similar time-
variation in relative risk aversion (Chetty and Szeidl (2005)).
While habit preferences1 seem to help in matching aggregate data, little is known
yet about whether the predictions of habit-formation models also ￿t with microdata.
Mehra and Prescott (2003), for example, point out that it is not clear whether investors
actually have the huge time varying counter-cyclical variations in risk aversion postu-
lated by models like Campbell and Cochrane (1999). One of the key implications of
di⁄erence habits is that individuals￿relative risk aversion should vary with wealth, in
contrast to models with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). An increase in wealth,
for example, should lead to a temporary decrease in relative risk aversion. This is an
important, but so far untested prediction. In this paper, we provide evidence on this
question from microdata on how households allocate their wealth between risky and
riskless assets.
To clarify the implications of di⁄erence habits for asset allocation, we start by study-
ing a simple discrete-time model of portfolio choice. The issues are most transparent if
we take the view that with CRRA preferences￿ i.e., without habit￿ the investor would
have su¢ ciently low risk aversion so that she would invest most of her liquid wealth in
risky assets. If we now introduce a di⁄erence habit, this increases the desire to hold
riskless assets. Their primary role is to provide su¢ cient ￿nancial resources to ensure
that future consumption can always be kept above the level of the habit. Hence, opti-
mal riskless asset holdings are tied to the slow-moving habit level and thus relatively
￿xed. But liquid wealth ￿ uctuates, due to capital gains, income, and consumption. As
a result, when liquid wealth increases, the optimal share of risky assets in the liquid
wealth portfolio increases, and vice versa. E⁄ectively, relative risk aversion varies with
wealth.
We test this prediction with household-level panel data from the Panel Study of
1In the following we often speak, for ease of reference, somewhat loosely of "habit preferences" or
"habit formation", but we mean di⁄erence habits (or subsistence levels, or consumption commitments
that lead to similar e⁄ects), which lead to time-varying risk aversion. But we exclude ratio habits of
the type used by Abel (1990), because they imply constant relative risk aversion.
1Income Dynamics (PSID), covering a period of about 20 years. We ￿rst examine how
changes in liquid wealth a⁄ect stock market participation. We ￿nd that changes in
liquid wealth have a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on the probability of stock market entry
and a negative e⁄ect on the probability of exit. While this is consistent with time-
varying risk aversion if there are some ￿xed per-period cost of participation, similar
e⁄ects also arise with CRRA preferences. Thus, these tests cannot discriminate between
habit models and models with CRRA preferences.
Unlike for the participation decision, we ￿nd that changes in liquid wealth essen-
tially play no role in explaining changes in asset allocation for households that partici-
pate in the stock market. We regress the change in proportion of liquid assets invested
in risky assets on the change in liquid wealth and ￿nd that the positive e⁄ect predicted
by di⁄erence-habit models is absent. If anything, the e⁄ect is slightly negative (but
economically tiny). This is not the result of low statistical power￿ our coe¢ cients are
quite precisely estimated. Thus, the asset allocation results favor the CRRA model.
Our regressions control for a broad set of household characteristics, including vari-
ables related to the life-cycle and time dummies to eliminate aggregate e⁄ects and focus
on cross-sectional variation. We also pay attention to measurement error. We obtain
similar results when we instrument changes in wealth with independently measured
income growth and inheritances, albeit with somewhat lower precision. Moreover, we
also show, theoretically, that it doesn￿ t matter whether the liquid wealth change is
anticipated, as long as the anticipated change is not entirely riskless. What matters is
that optimal riskless asset holdings are relatively ￿xed in the short-run, because they
are tied to the habit level, and thus any ￿ uctuation in current liquid wealth, whether
previously anticipated or not, leads to a change in the risky asset share.
One possible explanation for the lack of a contemporaneous e⁄ect of wealth changes
on asset allocation is that households￿asset allocation is governed by inertia. When
capital gains and losses arise, they are not rebalanced, and when in- and out￿ ows arise,
they a⁄ect mostly the riskless asset (cash) balances. With infrequent or delayed adjust-
ment, the ￿rst e⁄ect would lead to a positive, the latter e⁄ect to a negative relationship
between changes in liquid wealth and the liquid risky asset share. Indeed, we ￿nd that
inertia seems to be the dominant factor determining changes in asset allocation. The
PSID data on purchases and sales of risky assets allows us to reconstruct, approxi-
mately, how the portfolio allocation would look like if households had not bought or
sold risky assets between successive interview dates (assuming that all in- and out￿ ows
a⁄ect only cash balances). We ￿nd that actual portfolio allocations are quite close.
The data on purchases and sales are surely noisy and probably a⁄ected by forgotten
trades, but the strength of the inertia e⁄ect seems to be too big to be just the result
of measurement error.
Given that there seems to be strong inertia, we then check whether a positive
e⁄ect of liquid wealth changes on portfolio shares might appear if we allow for slow
adjustment. We regress future changes in the risky asset share on past changes in
2wealth and ￿nd a small positive e⁄ect. But in terms of economic magnitudes it is
again a very small e⁄ect, and it is statistically weak.
Taken together, our ￿ndings suggest that relative risk aversion does not vary with
wealth changes in the way postulated by habit-formation models. The large variations
in relative risk aversion induced by wealth changes that these theories predict are
evidently absent from microdata. At least with respect to the relationship between
asset allocation and wealth, our evidence suggests that constant relative risk aversion
is a good description of microeconomic behavior. But the CRRA model cannot explain
the large inertia in households￿portfolio shares either.
Our evidence on household asset allocation ties in well with some recent work
that ￿nds it hard to reconcile habit preferences and microdata along other dimensions
of households￿ economic choices. Dynan (2000) ￿nds no evidence that household-
level consumption growth exhibits the patterns predicted by internal habit-formation
models. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) study a life-cycle model of consumption and
portfolio choice and ￿nd that the introduction of habit formation makes it more di¢ cult
to match empirical regularities in microdata. A recent paper by Sahm (2006) examines
relative risk aversion measures elicited from responses to hypothetical gamble questions
in the Health and Retirement Study and ￿nds no e⁄ect of wealth changes on changes
in relative risk aversion. The ￿ndings in these studies contrast with Lupton (2003)
who ￿nds a negative relationship between past consumption levels and current risky
asset holdings, including businesses and real estate, which he argues is consistent with
habit formation, and Ravina (2005), who ￿nds support for habit formation in credit
card purchases data. The results in our (￿rst-di⁄erences) regressions are also consistent
with earlier evidence that the cross-sectional relationship between the level of the risky
asset share (Heaton and Lucas (2000); Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2003)) or elicited
relative risk aversion measures (Barksy, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)) and the
level of wealth is essentially ￿ at among households that participate in the stock market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple portfolio choice
model with habit preferences, our methodology, and the data. Section 3 reports our
main results. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of our results.
2 Theory and Methodology
2.1 Model of Asset Allocation with Habits
We develop a simple model of portfolio choice that illustrates how relative risk aversion
can be time-varying when agents￿preferences exhibit di⁄erence habits, subsistence
levels, or similar features. Let time be discrete and consider a single agent with in￿nite
horizon. The agent￿ s wealth at time t is denoted Wt and is measured before time t
consumption, Ct. There are two securities the agent can invest in: a risky asset, with
return Rt and a riskfree asset with constant return Rf. At time t the agent chooses Ct









subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
Wt+1 = (1 + Rp;t+1)(Wt ￿ Ct); (2)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor, ￿ is the curvature of the felicity function,
Rp;t+1 ￿ ￿t (Rt ￿ Rf) + Rf is the return on the investors￿liquid wealth portfolio, and
X is the habit. Consumption paths with Ct ￿ X at some future t with non-zero
probability are assigned in￿nitely negative utility. We assume that risky asset returns
have a log-normal distribution. Because we focus on cross-sectional di⁄erences between
households and not on aggregate variation, we also assume, for simplicity, constant
expected returns and constant volatility.
In our basic discussion we assume that X is constant. This should be thought of as
an approximation to a model in which X varies slowly. In the appendix we show that
our basic model can be viewed as an approximation to an internal habit model along the
lines of Constantinides (1990), where habit responds sluggishly to past consumption.
As Campbell and Cochrane (1999) point out, letting the habit level respond slowly,
over several years, to changes in consumption is necessary to match empirical features
of asset returns, such as a highly persistent price-dividend ratio, persistent volatility,
and long-run forecastability of returns, and so we focus on the e⁄ects of such slow
moving habits in our analysis. Alternatively, X could represent an external habit that
does not depend on the action of our single agent, a constant subsistence level, or the
cash-￿ ow stream required to ￿nance future committed consumption along the lines of
Chetty and Szeidl (2005).
We solve the agent￿ s problem by rede￿ning consumption and wealth such that the
objective and the budget constraint map into a standard CRRA problem, for which we
know the relevant properties of the solution. De￿ne surplus wealth W ￿
t ￿ Wt￿ X
Rf ￿X
and surplus consumption C￿










Now assume that the investor at time t invests a fraction ￿￿
t of Wt ￿ Ct ￿ X
Rf into
the risk asset, and the rest in the riskless asset. This surplus portfolio yields a return
R￿
p;t+1 ￿ ￿￿
t (Rt ￿ Rf)+Rf. The remaining X
Rf dollars are invested in the riskless asset.
Without further restrictions on ￿￿
t, this decomposition of the wealth portfolio into two
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Thus, our problem maps into the problem of a CRRA investor with wealth W ￿
t , con-
sumption C￿
t , and risky asset portfolio share ￿￿
t. If expected returns and volatility are
constant, ￿￿
t = ￿￿, i.e., it is constant, as we know from Samuelson (1969). Then the
risky asset share of our habit utility investor, as a fraction of post-consumption wealth









We now see that ￿t is increasing in Wt, holding X constant. The agent invests the
present value of the future habit, X=Rf, in riskless assets, and surplus wealth over
and above that amount like a CRRA investor. Hence, if Wt is close to X=Rf, the
agent￿ s e⁄ective relative risk aversion is high, because most of the wealth is used to
self-insure the stream of future habit. If Wt is a lot larger than X=Rf, the agent invests
approximately like a CRRA investor.
So far, the agent￿ s wealth is composed entirely liquid wealth, by which we mean the
sum of stocks and riskless bonds. In a more realistic model, however, the household
would also have so-called background wealth, i.e., labor income, housing wealth, and
perhaps wealth in a private business. Labor income and business ownership are sources
of risky income. Home equity represents a risky asset if the household expects to sell
at some point, say at retirement (or trade to a house of di⁄erent size, or in a di⁄erent
location).2 The presence of background wealth complicates the relationship between
liquid wealth levels, habit, and the proportion of liquid wealth allocated to stocks,
because ￿￿, and hence also ￿t, depend on how much background wealth the agent has,
and on the riskiness of background wealth. This makes the portfolio choice problem
quite untractable.
Fortunately, the existing literature shows that as long as the returns on background
wealth have a relatively low correlation with stock returns (for which there is some
empirical support), the main e⁄ect of risky background wealth is a diversi￿cation e⁄ect.
That is, the presence of background wealth allows the household to diversify away some
of the risks of stocks, reducing the aversion to holding stocks.3 This diversi￿cation e⁄ect
can simplify the problem.
2Costs of adjusting the holdings of illiquid background wealth can also lead to an additional e⁄ect
of house ownership that relates to one of the possible interpretations of X. Recognizing that housing
is often ￿nanced by collateralized borrowing (mortgage), and that many households own a house for
most of their life, one can view housing as a long-lived durable good to which the household has
committed ￿nancial resources of future periods, and whose consumption is very costly to adjust. In
this case, the mortgage payments have the same consequences as a habit. The agent uses riskless
assets to self-insure and be able to meet future mortgage payments to avoid large adjustment costs of
trading down to a smaller house. This e⁄ect is analyzed in Chetty and Szeidl (2005) and X can be
viewed as incorporating the e⁄ects of habits and of such committed future payments.
3It￿ s important to distinguish here between models that examine the e⁄ect of adding mean-zero
5The very purpose of habit-formation models is to try to explain facts about asset
returns and consumption with moderate values for the felicity curvature parameter ￿.
For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) set ￿ = 2 and the habit is responsible
for the lion￿ s share of e⁄ective relative risk aversion and its variation over time; the
curvature of the felicity function would induce very little relative risk aversion in the
absence of the habit. For such moderate values of ￿, realistically calibrated models
of household portfolio choice with CRRA preferences and background wealth, such as
Bertaut and Haliassos (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Cocco (2004), Cocco, Maen-
hout, and Gomes (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005) all ￿nd that households should
basically invest 100% of their liquid wealth in stocks. In other words, ￿￿ = 1. Note
also that 100% is the upper bound (i.e., no leverage) for the allocation to risky assets in
discrete time if background wealth is risky (in the sense that there is a strictly positive
probability that background wealth can fall to an arbitrarily small value over the next
period).
These results suggest that we can incorporate the e⁄ects of housing wealth and
labor income into our model by approximating ￿￿ ￿ 1, i.e., by assuming that a CRRA
investor without habit would invest about 100% of his liquid wealth in stocks. By
making this approximation, we e⁄ectively assume that the habit does most of the lifting
required to get risky asset shares below 100% in our portfolio choice model. This is
eminently consistent with the spirit of habit-formation equilibrium models where the
habit does most of the lifting to get a sizeable equity risk premium.
The bene￿t of this approximation is that the optimal portfolio share no longer
depends on background wealth and that it varies over time only because of variation
in X
Wt￿Ct, not because of variation in ￿￿:




Eq. (7) provides the basis for the main tests in the paper. The analyses where we
assume ￿￿ ￿ 1 should be interpreted as a test of the joint hypothesis that habits
lead to time-variation in risky asset shares and that the variation induced by habits
dominates the e⁄ects of variation in background risks.
But we also examine alternative speci￿cations where we relax the ￿￿ ￿ 1 as-
sumption. Allowing for a range of values that are still relatively close to one, say
0:9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1, would make little di⁄erence as long as variation in X
Wt￿Ct dominates vari-
ation in ￿￿. If ￿￿ is instead substantially smaller than one, we have to take into account
that a changing composition of wealth can change the degree to which stock market
risk is diversi￿ed away in background wealth. We relax the ￿￿ ￿ 1 approximation in
two heuristic ways.
background risks (e.g., Gollier and Pratt (1996)) from the portfolio choice literature that￿ s our focus
here, where background wealth is added, which has positive mean returns.
6First, when we look at the liquid risky asset share, we control for the relative mag-
nitude of background wealth. We use the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted
with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth
ratio, which should help capture variation in ￿￿. In the end, we ￿nd that these con-
trols have little e⁄ect. This is consistent with cross-sectional analyses in the literature.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Yao and Zhang (2005) ￿nd little evidence that these as-
set composition ratios are correlated with liquid risky asset shares (among households
that participate in the stock market), perhaps with the exception of the relative share
of business wealth, which seems to have some small negative impact. These empirical
￿ndings also support our approximation assumption ￿￿ ￿ 1.
Second, we look at the ￿nancial wealth (liquid plus housing plus business wealth)
risky asset share. On the right-hand side of Eq. (6) one then also has to rede￿ne Wt as
￿nancial wealth. The only background wealth component left is human wealth, which
is di¢ cult to measure. We include the labor income/￿nancial wealth ratio interacted
with age as a proxy for background human wealth.
2.2 Implications for Time-variation in Risky Asset Holdings
We are interested in the implications of habit formation for time-variation in the will-
ingness to hold risky assets. To obtain our estimating equation, we ￿rst linearize
Equation (7),
￿t = 1 ￿
X
(Wt ￿ Ct)Rf
= 1 ￿ exp(x ￿ wt)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(x ￿ wt): (8)
where x ￿ log(X=Rf), wt ￿ log(Wt ￿ Ct) 4, and the last approximate equality follows
from a ￿rst-order Taylor approximation, where ￿ and ￿ are constants, and ￿ > 0.
Intuitively, when Wt is close to X, changes in Wt have a big e⁄ect on X=Wt at the
margin, but the e⁄ect is small when Wt is big. This feature is preserved by linearizing
around the log habit-wealth ratio, such that ￿t is linear in log liquid wealth, so that
the bigger Wt, the smaller the marginal impact of an increase in Wt.
Taking ￿rst di⁄erences of equation (8), we get
￿￿t = ￿￿wt: (9)
This result depends on our assumption that X is approximately constant. As discussed
above, it can be justi￿ed, for example, by looking at idiosyncratic wealth shocks and X
4Note that in our empirical data, we measure post-consumption wealth each period, so the de￿nition
of wt corresponds to the de￿nition of wealth in the data.
7as an external habit that is not a⁄ected by idiosyncratic wealth shocks, or with X as
an internal habit that is slowly moving, and so reacts only very sluggishly to changes
in wealth. Eq. (9) forms the basis for our empirical tests.
Anticipated vs. unexpected wealth changes￿ When taking our model to the data, an
important question is whether the relationship between changes in liquid wealth and
portfolio shares would be modi￿ed if changes in liquid wealth are partly anticipated.
It turns out that this distinction does not matter for the validity of our tests.
Consider the following example. At t = 1, the agent expects to receive a big one-
time payment, for example an inheritance from a rich uncle, in period t = 2. Let￿ s
assume that the probability of getting the inheritance is high, and the risk of obtaining
or not obtaining it (for example, because the uncle prefers to donate the money to
charity) and the value of the uncle￿ s assets are uncorrelated with stock market returns.
The key point is that a small probability of not getting the inheritance is su¢ cient to
make the anticipated inheritance unsuitable as a means to insure future habit. Hence,
at t = 1, the agent still needs to invest X
Rf in riskless assets to insure future habit,
despite the anticipated inheritance. Only when the inheritance is actually received at
t = 2, but not before, liquid wealth increases relative to X
Rf, and the risky asset share
increases.
In this example, the dollar amount of stock holdings moves one-for-one with realized
changes in the dollar amount of liquid wealth, despite the fact that the agent anticipated
the change in liquid wealth. One can show that a similar logic applies when the
agent invests less than 100% of surplus wealth in stocks, and with non-constant, but
slow-moving habits, and when one incorporates the consumption-savings decision. In
Appendix A.2 we numerically solve a three-period model that illustrates these e⁄ects.5
In summary, it is not crucial for our tests to distinguish between anticipated and
unanticipated changes in liquid wealth. What we need to control for, however, is that
portfolio shares of risky assets and wealth may have some common predictable life-cycle
pattern, for reasons unrelated to habit. But this is a di⁄erent issue that we address
below.
Stock market participation￿ In the model above, the agent would always participate
in the stock market (￿t > 0), because the optimal investment policy ensures that
Wt ￿Ct > X
Rf (given su¢ cient initial wealth W0). However, if one extended the model
5It may be useful at this point to draw an analogy to the consumption literature. Power utility
implies a precautionary savings motive. In that case, consumers faced with an expectation of a big
in￿ ow in the near future, but which can be low or zero with strictly positive probability would hesitate
to run down savings to raise today￿ s consumption, because that would expose them to a small, but
signi￿cant risk that consumption might be extremely low in the future if the anticipated in￿ ow does
not realize (Zeldes (1989), Carroll (1997)). In other words, consumption displays "excess" sensitivity
to anticipated changes in income. In the same way, an investor with habit preferences faced with an
anticipated in￿ ow is deterred from increasing the risky asset share by a possibly very small probability
that this in￿ ow might not realize. As a consequence, the portfolio share does not react until the income
is realized, as long as there is some residual uncertainty about this income change.
8and allowed for some costs of participating in the stock market, the household might
choose non-participation (see, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gomes and Michaelides
(2005)). These costs might be of ￿nancial nature, they could be opportunity costs of
time and attention, and also psychological costs.
Suppose one extended the model to include a ￿xed per-period participation costs.
Then, changes in liquid wealth could induce stock market entry or exit. For example,
a household experiencing a negative change in wealth might choose to exit. This
happens for two reasons. The ￿rst is that with a lower amount of wealth, the bene￿ts
from investing in stocks are smaller relative to the ￿xed level of costs. This e⁄ect would
arise even with CRRA preferences. Second, in the model with habit, as liquid wealth
declines, the agent wants to invest a smaller amount of the shrunken liquid wealth in
stocks, further reducing the bene￿ts from participating.
The latter e⁄ect suggests that the presence of habits could lead to time-varying
stock market participation. We therefore also look at the empirical relationship between
changes in liquid wealth and stock market entry and exit. But it￿ s important to keep
in mind that this is only a ￿rst step. A ￿nding that stock market participation varies
with changes in liquid wealth will, on its own, not be su¢ cient to discriminate between
CRRA and the habit model.
2.3 Econometric Issues
In our data, we have observations on wealth and asset holdings at dates that are k = 5
years or k = 2 years apart, depending on the subsample. Therefore, we rewrite Eq.
(9) as ￿k￿t = ￿￿kwt, where ￿k denotes a k-period ￿rst-di⁄erence operator, ￿kyt ￿
yt ￿ yt￿k.
To arrive at our estimating equation, we must take into account that variables
outside of the model may cause common movements in the level of liquid assets and the
risky asset share. For example, it is possible that both ￿t and wt have some correlated
deterministic pattern over the life-cycle. Therefore, we condition on a vector qt￿k of
household characteristics that should capture such patterns, if present. It includes
variables that are either constant or known at t￿k, and a vector of ones. In addition,
most of our Speci￿cations also include ￿kht, a vector of variables that capture major
changes in family composition or asset ownership that could lead to preference shifts
that are possibly correlated with ￿kwt. Finally, we add a mean-zero error term "t,
which captures unobserved forces on the portfolio share that are outside of the model
and that are uncorrelated with ￿kwt, qt￿k, and ￿kht. Thus, our estimating equation
is
￿k￿t = ￿qt￿k + ￿￿kht + ￿￿kwt + "t: (10)
To reduce clutter, we continue to omit household subscripts. In our basic speci￿cation,
we assume that wt is well-measured so that "t is uncorrelated with ￿kwt and the other
9regressors and we can estimate Eq. (10) with ordinary least squares (OLS). Below we
also consider violations of this assumption when wt and ￿t are measured with error.
Life-cycle e⁄ects and preference shifters￿ Our conditioning variables in qt￿k include
a broad range of variables related to the life-cycle, background, and the ￿nancial situ-
ation of the household at t￿k. For lack of a better name, we refer to them collectively
as life-cycle controls. We include age and age2; indicators for completed high school
and college education, respectively, and their interaction with age and age2; dummy
variables for gender and their interaction with age and age2, marital status, health sta-
tus; the number of children in the household, the number of people in the household;
dummy variables for any unemployment in the k years leading up to and including year
t ￿ k, and for coverage of the household head￿ s job by a union contract. In addition,
we include the log of the equity in vehicles owned by the household, log family income
at t￿k￿4, 2-year growth in log family income at t￿k and t￿k￿2, and a variable for
inheritances received in the k years leading up to and including year t ￿ k. The other
category of control variables, labelled as preference shifters, ￿kht, includes changes in
some household characteristics between t ￿ k and t: changes in family size, changes in
the number of children, and a sets of dummies for house ownership, business owner-
ship, and non-zero labor income at t and t ￿ k. The idea behind the house ownership
dummies, for example, is that households might save for the purchase of a home with
mostly riskless assets, experiencing increasing wealth over time, but when the home is
purchased eventually, the holdings of riskless assets drop strongly (see, e.g., Faig and
Shun (2002)). The dummies at t and t ￿ k should absorb those e⁄ects.
Idiosyncratic vs. aggregate wealth changes￿ Our partial equilibrium portfolio choice
model deals with the decision of a single household, holding constant aggregate quan-
tities and prices. But if a wealth change is common to all households, and hence they
all want to change their exposure to risky assets, the e⁄ect on asset allocation is damp-
ened, because instead of quantity, it￿ s now the price (and thus, the expected return)
of risky assets that adjusts. To uncover the e⁄ects of habits, we must therefore elim-
inate aggregate changes in wealth and asset holdings and focus on household-speci￿c
variation. For this reason, we include time ￿xed e⁄ects in qit￿k, which e⁄ectively de-
means wealth changes and risky asset shares cross-sectionally. In Appendix A.3 we
show that our estimator is consistent as the number of cross-sectional units N ! 1.
In addition, we also recognize that there could be local e⁄ects, where asset holdings
and household income and other sources of wealth variation are tied to the local econ-
omy. To eliminate such local e⁄ects as much as possible, we interact the year dummies
with dummies for the four PSID geographical regions, which provides us with a set of
year-region dummies.
Measurement error￿ Measurement error is a standard concern with microdata from
surveys. We model measured wealth as e wt ￿ wt + ut, i.e. the sum of true wealth
and a measurement error ut,. which implies ￿k e wt = ￿kwt + ￿kut. We assume that
measurement error is uncorrelated with true wealth. More precisely, we assume that
10Cov (ut+i;wt) = 0 for i = ￿1;0;1, so that Cov (￿kut;￿kwt) = 0: Let the measured
risky asset share be e ￿t = ￿t + vt, with measurement error vt. Substituting wealth and
the risky asset share into Eq. (10), we obtain
￿ke ￿t = ￿qt￿k + ￿￿kht + ￿￿k e wt + "t + vt ￿ ￿￿kut (11)
Measurement error renders OLS inconsistent because ￿k e wt and the composite residual
"t+vt￿￿￿kut are correlated. First, Cov (￿k e wt;￿kut) > 0, which biases the coe¢ cient
estimate for ￿ towards zero. Second, because the numerator (stocks) and denomina-
tor (stocks plus riskless assets) of ￿t are made up by components of wt, we should
also expect that Cov (￿k e wt;vt) 6= 0, which could also bias the sign of the coe¢ cient.
Speci￿cally, measurement error only in stock holdings would lead to Cov (￿k e wt;vt) > 0,
measurement error only in riskless assets would lead to Cov (￿k e wt;vt) < 0. It is not
possible to unambiguously sign the combined e⁄ect when both stock holdings and
riskless assets are mismeasured. Overall, the bias in the estimate of ￿ could go in
either direction, depending on whether measurement error in stocks or riskless assets
dominates.
To address the measurement error problem, we look for instrumental variables for
￿kwt. The identi￿cation requirement is that the instruments, zt, are (partially) corre-
lated with ￿kwt, but not with "t + vt ￿ ￿￿kut. Given such instruments, we can esti-
mate ￿ consistently with two-stage least squares (TSLS). Our instruments are quantile
dummies for income growth from t ￿ k to t (similar to Dynan (2000) in a di⁄erent
application), and inheritance receipts (as in Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003)) between
t￿k and t. These instruments are based upon survey questions that are di⁄erent from
those for the components of wt. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the elements of
zt are uncorrelated with "t + vt ￿ ￿￿kut.
Unfortunately, it is to be expected that we lose precision compared with the OLS
estimator, and so there is a tradeo⁄ between potential measurement-error bias and
precision. A priori, it is not clear that the TSLS estimator will be closer to the true
parameter in a mean-squared error sense. Therefore, we report both the OLS and
TSLS results in our tests.
2.4 Data
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), obtained from the
University of Michigan. It is a longitudinal study that tracks family units and their
o⁄spring over time. We use data on asset holdings collected in the years 1984, 1989,
1994, 1999, and 2001, and 2003. Income data and many household characteristics are
available annually until 1997, and every second year from then onwards. Appendix A.4
describes our data in more detail. Here we brie￿ y discuss the de￿nition of the variables
that we extract from the ￿les. To make magnitudes comparable over time, we de￿ ate
11all income and wealth data by the consumer price index (CPI) into December 2001
dollars.
Variable de￿nitions￿ We de￿ne liquid assets as the sum of holdings of stocks and
mutual funds plus riskless assets, where we follow common practice and de￿ne riskless
assets as the sum of cash-like assets and holdings of bonds. Subtracting other debts,
which comprises non-mortgage debt such as credit card debt and consumer loans, from
liquid assets yields liquid wealth. We further denote the sum of liquid wealth, equity
in a private business, and home equity as ￿nancial wealth.
We then calculate two risky asset shares: First, the sum of stocks and mutual funds
held, divided by liquid assets (the liquid risky asset share).6 Second, the sum of stocks
and mutual funds, home equity, and equity in a private business, divided by ￿nancial
wealth (the ￿nancial risky asset share).
As our income variable we use total family income. The inheritance variable in-
cluded in the vector of household characteristics qt￿k is the value of inheritances re-
ceived scaled by income to adjust for the fact that a given amount of inheritance has
di⁄erent relevance for households with di⁄erent income and wealth. More precisely, we
measure it as the log of one plus the value of the inheritance divided by family income
at t ￿ k ￿ 4, in the k = 5 subsample, and t ￿ k ￿ 2 in the k = 2 subsample.7 We want
to use this variable as an instrument for liquid wealth, so we obviously cannot scale by
wealth, and we scale by income instead.
In years when the wealth questions were administered, the PSID asked subjects
to report on the amount of stocks and mutual funds bought and/or sold during the
time since the previous wealth survey (i.e., in the 1989 wave for the time from 1984 to
1989). This information allows us to decompose the change in the amount of stocks and
mutual funds held into an active investment/disinvestment component and a capital
gains/losses component (see Appendix A.4 for details). There is reason to expect that
this active investment information is noisy and that some households may systemati-
cally forget trades. We do not use the capital gains and active investment information
in our main tests, only later when we examine inertia e⁄ects. We discuss the measure-
ment error issue at that point.
Sample selection and weighting￿ To be included in our sample, we require that the
marital status of the family unit head remained unchanged from t ￿ k to t and that
no assets were moved in or out as a consequence of a family member moving into or
out of the family unit. We also exclude observations on households if the household
6Since we don￿ t have more detailed information on the composition of risky asset holdings, we
don￿ t know, for example, whether households hold stocks with low or high systematic risk or how
well they are diversi￿ed. However, our focus is on whether households reallocate between stocks and
riskless assets in response to wealth changes, not on whether they reallocate between stocks of di⁄erent
systematic risk (which the theory is silent about).
7We don￿ t use t ￿ k ￿ 5 income in the earlier subsample, because we want to avoid using income
data from prior to survey year 1980 when topcoding of income was much more prevalent than in later
years.
12head is retired at t. For risky asset shares to be meaningful, we also require a certain
minimum level of wealth. We therefore exclude households with liquid wealth less than
$10,000 or ￿nancial wealth less than $10,000 at t ￿ k. Overall, the data requirements
are quite demanding. In many of our regressions we need observations on income at
t￿k ￿2, and t￿k ￿4. This means that we need households that participate in many
consecutive waves of the survey. We weight observations with PSID sample weights
when we present summary statistics, but we do not use the sample weights in our
regression analyses, because doing so would be ine¢ cient (Deaton (1997), p. 70). In
any case, as Appendix A.5 shows, weighted regressions produce similar results.
Summary statistics￿ Table 1 presents summary statistics. The two top panels show
pooled cross-section/time-series statistics for all households that satis￿ed the data and
minimum lagged wealth requirements to be included in the sample. The two bottom
panels show statistics for stock market participants, that is, those households that have
stock holdings greater than zero at t and t ￿ k. We further report separate summary
statistics for our 1984-1999 sample, for which the time-span between successive waves
of the PSID with wealth information is k = 5 years, and the 1999-2003 sample, for
which k = 2.
As the table shows, the proportion of households participating in the stock market
is 45% in the 1984-1999 sample, and 58% in 1999-2003. The large fraction of non-
participants and the upward trend over time is roughly consistent with previous studies
(e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), but here the participation rate is somewhat higher
because we focus on households that satisfy our minimum wealth requirements. The
stock market entry variable in the two top panels is a dummy that is set to one for
households that did not participate at t ￿ k and participate at t, and zero if the
household does not hold stocks in t ￿ k and t. For households that participated in
t ￿ k, the variable is set to missing (therefore the lower number of observations).
The stock market exit variable is de￿ned in similar manner. It is equal to one for
participants in t ￿ k, but not t, zero for those that participated in t ￿ k and t, and
missing otherwise. The numbers in the table show that there is considerable turnover
in the group of participants. On average, between 34-35% of non-participants at t ￿ k
enter the stock market until t, while about 19-24% of participants choose to exit. In
our ￿rst tests below, we explore whether the probability of entry and exit is related to
changes in liquid wealth.
Comparing wealth and income means and medians for all households and those for
stock market participants, it is apparent that stock market participants have higher
wealth and income on average. Combined with the fact that much of aggregate wealth
is concentrated at the top end of the wealth distribution, wealthy households are, in
some respects, the most important group of stock holders. Because extremely wealthy
households have low response rates in surveys, they are not well represented in the
PSID.8 However, Juster, Smith, and Sta⁄ord (1999) ￿nd that the wealth data in the
8An additional concern is topcoding, where observations above a certain threshold are set to the
13PSID lines up well with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (which
oversamples high income households and provides better data at the top end of the
wealth distribution, but does not have a panel structure) at least up through the 98th
percentile of the wealth distribution. Hence, our data should give us a good picture of
the asset allocation choices of wealthy households, except for the extremely wealthy.
But it is also useful to keep in mind that for testing the habit formation theory it is
not crucial to have data from the very top end of the wealth distribution, because the
theory does not predict that households with moderate levels of wealth should behave
di⁄erently from households with very high levels of wealth.
The distribution of wealth and income has strong positive skewness. But when
we examine changes in wealth and income, we di⁄erence logs. As the two bottom
panels show, taking logs eliminates much of the skewness. The distribution of k-period
di⁄erences in log wealth and log income is roughly symmetric. The 10th and 90th
percentiles show that the k-period changes in log wealth are substantial, in particular
in the 1984-1999 period, where k = 5.
The habit formation model predicts that these changes in wealth should give rise
to changes in the risky asset share. As the statistics for the proportions of liquid and
￿nancial wealth invested in risky assets (%liq.assets risky and %￿n.wealth risky) show,
there is large variation in these risky asset shares over time. Whether these changes
are related to wealth ￿ uctuations is the subject of our main tests.
3 Results
3.1 Wealth Changes and Stock Market Participation
We start by investigating how changes in liquid wealth relate to stock market par-
ticipation. There is existing evidence that higher wealth is associated with a higher
probability that a household participates in the stock market (Bertaut and Halias-
sos (1995); Mankiw and Zeldes (1991); Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), but this evidence
is cross-sectional and does not necessarily speak to the dynamic relationship between
changes in wealth and entry and exit. It is also possible that levels of liquid wealth are
correlated with some unobserved ￿xed household characteristics that cause participa-
tion. Di⁄erencing removes the e⁄ect of these household characteristics.
Table 2 presents the results of probit regressions. In the ￿rst two columns, we
estimate the probability of a household that did not participate at t ￿ k to enter the
stock market until time t. In columns three and four we estimate the probability that a
household that is participating at t￿k exits the stock market until t. The table shows
threshold value to protect the identity of the household. But in the PSID these cuto⁄s are very high
($10 million per wealth component until the late 1990s and $100 million subsequently) and a⁄ect only
a very small number of cases.
14the marginal e⁄ects, that is, the e⁄ect on the probability of entry or exit, evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables. The regressions include all the
preference shifters and life-cycle controls we mentioned in Section 2.3. The focus of
our interest is on the coe¢ cient for the change in log liquid wealth.
As the table shows, in both samples (1984-1999 and 1999-2003) we ￿nd a positive
coe¢ cient, with high statistical signi￿cance. The point estimate of 0.124 in the ￿rst
column implies that an increase in liquid wealth by 10% implies a roughly 1% increase
in the probability to participate in the stock market. Hence, it is not a large e⁄ect, but
it￿ s not negligible either. The exit regressions in columns three and four show that the
probability of exiting the stock market is negatively related to changes in liquid wealth.
The magnitudes of the point estimates are a little smaller than for the entry regres-
sions, but they, too, are di⁄erent from zero at a high level of statistical signi￿cance.
That changes in liquid wealth are signi￿cantly related to stock market entry and exit
also provides some reassurance on the measurement error issue. Evidently, measured
changes in liquid wealth are not driven entirely by measurement noise, otherwise we
wouldn￿ t ￿nd a signi￿cant relationship with stock market participation.
In summary, changes in liquid wealth appear to be one of the factors that causes
changes in stock market participation. The reliably positive e⁄ect we ￿nd is consistent
with time-varying risk aversion due to wealth changes, but it is also consistent with
CRRA preferences in a model with ￿xed per-period participation costs.
3.2 Wealth Changes and Asset Allocation
We now turn to our main tests, looking at changes in the risky asset share conditional
on participation, i.e., for those households that participate in the stock market at t￿k
and t. Our goal is to estimate Eq. (10), and we do so with OLS and TSLS.
First Stage￿ Table 3 presents the TSLS ￿rst-stage estimates. The instruments are
two indicator variables for log income growth between t￿k and t below the 10th or above
the 90th percentile (see Table 1 for the value of these percentiles). Furthermore, we
include an instrument for whether the household reports to have received an inheritance
between t ￿ k and t (see Section 2.4 for de￿nition).
The results in the table show that the instruments have a signi￿cant partial corre-
lation with changes in log liquid wealth (columns 1 and 2) and changes in log ￿nancial
wealth (columns 3 and 4) and the directions of the estimated e⁄ects are reasonable:
higher income growth and a higher inheritance are associated with higher growth in
liquid and ￿nancial wealth. The partial R2 of the instruments is between 0.01 and
0.02, which suggests that the instruments still leave a large fraction of variation in
wealth changes unexplained. This is typical for microdata. Nevertheless, the instru-
ments are jointly highly signi￿cant, with p-values smaller than 0.005 for each of the
Speci￿cations. The F-statistics are, however, a bit lower than the rule of thumb of 10
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), below which the TSLS estimator is likely to
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to weak instruments.9 In Appendix A.5 we re-estimate our regressions with methods
that are robust for weak instruments along the lines of Moreira (2003) and ￿nd similar
point estimates, albeit with wider con￿dence intervals.
Changes in liquid risky asset shares￿ Table 4 presents our main results. We regress
changes in the liquid risky asset share on changes in liquid wealth. The habit model
predicts that we should ￿nd a positive coe¢ cient, but as the table shows the point
estimates are very close to zero. In fact, for the OLS estimate in column 1 for the
1984￿1999 sample we can reject at conventional signi￿cance levels that the coe¢ cient is
greater than zero. However, economically the estimate is basically zero. The coe¢ cient
of ￿0:013 in column 1 implies that 10% growth in real wealth leads to a tiny reduction in
the share of risky liquid assets by 0:0013, e.g. from 50% to 49:87%. For the 1999￿2003
sample, the estimate in column 4 is slightly positive, but again of tiny magnitude and
statistically not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The low explanatory power of wealth
changes is also underscored by the low R2 in these regressions, where essentially none
of the variables, including the controls, explains an economically signi￿cant portion of
changes in risky asset shares.
Having the two subsamples is useful, because they di⁄er in the length of time
between wealth measurement points. If habits are not su¢ ciently sluggish in catching
up with consumption, having k = 5 years could be too long in the sense that there
would be relatively quick mean reversion in risky asset shares, and so our regressions
might not pick up much of the correlation with wealth changes. However, in the
1999 ￿ 2003 subsample, we have k = 2 years, and we still ￿nd coe¢ cient estimates
that are virtually zero economically. It is, of course, still possible that we miss habit
e⁄ects on the risky asset shares at even higher frequencies￿ but such high-frequency
e⁄ects cannot be those that drive the slow-moving variation in risky asset risk premia
targeted by habit-formation asset pricing models.
In columns 2 and 5, we include asset composition controls: the labor income/liquid
wealth ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the hous-
ing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. The aim is to control for variations in background
wealth. We still obtain almost identical coe¢ cients on changes in liquid wealth. This
suggests that the results are not driven by some correlation of liquid wealth changes
with changes in background risk exposure due to variation in the asset mix held by the
household. Our results in di⁄erences are consistent with earlier purely cross-sectional
studies that have found a largely insigni￿cant relationship between these asset compo-
sition ratios and the liquid risky asset share among stock market participants (Heaton
and Lucas (2000); Yao and Zhang (2005)).
The TSLS results in columns 3 and 6 show that measurement error does not appear
9The simulations in Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest that with an F-statistic greater than 5.39 we
can reject at a 5% signi￿cance level the hypothesis that the maximal bias of the TSLS estimator
relative to OLS is greater than 0.3.
16to have a major in￿ uence on our results. Both estimates are negative and close to the
OLS results, in particular for the 1984 ￿ 1999 sample, but with higher standard error.
The estimate for the 1999￿2003 subsample is somewhat larger in magnitude, but that
should not be overinterpreted, because the standard error is also much larger than with
OLS. The table also reports p-values from an overidenti￿cation test that show that we
cannot reject that the instruments are valid (in the sense of being uncorrelated with
the regression residual). Overall, the TSLS results do not provide any evidence that
there is a signi￿cant positive relationship between changes in liquid wealth and changes
in the liquid risky asset share.
Changes in ￿nancial risky asset shares￿ As an additional perspective on the issue
of asset composition and background risk, Table 5 reports regressions similar to those in
Table 4, but with the ￿nancial risky asset share as dependent variable, and with changes
in ￿nancial wealth as explanatory variable. This perspective would be appropriate
if households with CRRA preferences would keep the proportion of ￿nancial wealth
invested in risky assets, including home equity and business wealth, roughly constant.
In that case, the presence of habit formation would imply that changes in ￿nancial
wealth should lead to changes in the ￿nancial risky asset share.
As the table shows, however, this approach doesn￿ t produce any evidence for a posi-
tive relationship between wealth changes and risky asset shares either. The coe¢ cients
are all negative, for both subsamples, with OLS and TSLS, and with and without as-
set composition control (the asset composition controls here consist only of the labor
income/￿nancial wealth ratio interacted with age, as human wealth is the only remain-
ing background wealth component that is not included in the risky asset share). The
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are larger than in Table 4, and they are all signi￿cantly
smaller than zero. Thus, the evidence is not consistent with the predictions of the
habit model.
Robustness checks￿ Appendix A.5 reports a large number of robustness checks. The
results are generally similar to those in our main tests, so we just brie￿ y summarize
here some of the variations in methodology that we explore. To check the sensitivity to
the particular linearization in Eq. (8), we examine log and logit transformations of the
risky asset shares. We also re-run our liquid risky asset share regressions accounting
for leverage. We also ￿nd similar results when we weight observations with sample
weights, and when we use a median regression estimator (which is not sensitive to
outliers)
3.3 Inertia in Asset Allocation
One possible reason for the absence of a positive e⁄ect of wealth changes on risky asset
shares could be that the e⁄ect is clouded by inertia. If an in- or out￿ ow of liquid wealth
materializes ￿rst in the riskless asset category (e.g., cash), and households are slow
to rebalance their portfolio, this can induce a negative contemporaneous relationship
17between liquid wealth changes and risky asset shares. Of course, capital gains and
losses on risky assets have the opposite e⁄ect: They lead to a positive contemporaneous
relationship if the household is slow to rebalance.
The regressions reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 show that both e⁄ects
are present. In that regression, we include a proxy for the risky asset return of the
household between t and t￿k (for capital gains and losses, excluding dividends, to be
precise), which we back out using the information on net purchases or sales of risky
assets in the PSID. The risky asset return is strongly positively related to the liquid
risky asset share, and changes in wealth have a more negative coe¢ cient compared
with our earlier results in Table 4, now that the risky asset return is included in the
regression.
Estimating the degree of inertia￿ We now proceed to analyze in more detail how
much inertia there is in portfolio allocations. We use the information on net purchases
or sales of risky assets to construct a variable ￿kInertt: it represents the (counterfac-
tual) change in the liquid risky asset share that the household would have experienced
between t ￿ k and t under perfect inertia￿ that is, if it had not undertaken any pur-
chases or sales of risky assets between t￿k and t. In this case, the risky asset position
would have changed only because of capital gains and losses, and the riskless asset
position would have changed only because of in- and out￿ ows (e.g., via cash or the
checking account). We then modify our wealth regression, Equation (10), by including
￿kInertt:
￿k￿t = ￿qt￿k + ￿￿kht + ’￿kInertt + ￿￿kwt + "t: (12)
If households exhibit perfect inertia, then the actual change in ￿k￿t is equal to
￿kInertt, and therefore ’ = 1. If households exhibit no inertia at all, and hence
rebalance their portfolios immediately following capital gains and in￿ ows and out￿ ows
of liquid wealth, then ’ = 0. If households chase returns, in the sense that they buy
more stocks following capital gains, then they exacerbate the e⁄ect of capital gains and
it is possible that ’ > 1.
It is useful to keep in mind that purchases and sales of risky assets, and hence
￿kInertt, are likely to be measured with signi￿cant error. In addition to the usual
attenuation bias of classical errors-in-variables, the biggest concern is systematic un-
derreporting of trades (forgotten trades). Households in the PSID are asked to recall
the amount of purchases and sales over the last k years and it is plausible that they
might forget some trades (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). In that case, part of the change
in the value of liquid risky assets would be attributed wrongly to capital gains/losses
instead of purchases/sales. This would lead to a spurious positive relationship between
￿kInertt and ￿k￿t. We do not have instruments for household-speci￿c capital gains
and losses, so using instrumental variables is not feasible and measurement error re-
mains a concern. We can do at least a weak check by comparing results for the ￿rst
subsample, where the recall period is 5 years, with those for the second subsample,
where the recall period is 2 years. Also, we can look at subsamples excluding the
18households that report no trades at all, which may be the most error-prone ones.
Table 6 presents results from estimating Eq. (12) with OLS. As columns 2 and 5
show, the coe¢ cient on the inertia variable is large, around 0:75, with small standard
errors. Taken at face value, it suggests that there is huge inertia. Households￿asset
allocations seem to ￿ uctuate strongly as a function of in- and out￿ ows, and capital
gains and losses, without much rebalancing taking place. The coe¢ cient on changes
in liquid wealth is close to zero, as before. The R2 is now around 0:70, which is huge
compared with the small R2 in Table 4.
But as we pointed out, it￿ s possible that some of this e⁄ect is driven by underre-
porting of trades. The magnitudes of the coe¢ cient estimates below, however, make
it somewhat unlikely that this is the whole story. Underreporting would have to be
extremely common to explain the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients we ￿nd.
To provide some perspective on the trade-reporting issue, columns 3 and 6 present
regressions where we interact both the inertia variable and the liquid wealth changes
variable with a dummy that we name Tradet. It takes a value of one if the household
reported any net trade in risky assets for the period from t ￿ k to t and it is zero
otherwise (the percentage of households that report to have traded is 59% in the 1984-
1999 sample and 57% in the 1999-2003 sample). The coe¢ cient on ￿kInertt now
picks up the e⁄ect for those who don￿ t trade (and the estimate is equal to one, not
surprisingly), while the e⁄ect for those who report trades can be obtained by adding
the coe¢ cient on ￿kInertt and ￿kInertt￿ Tradet, which yields about 0:65 in both
subsamples. Thus, even for those that report trades, we still ￿nd a strong inertia
e⁄ect.
We also interact the Tradet variable with changes in liquid wealth, but as the
table shows there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the wealth changes coe¢ cient between
households that report trades and those that do not (the same is true if we exclude
the inertia variable and its interaction with Tradet from this regression). Hence, the
absence of a positive e⁄ect of wealth changes on changes in risky asset shares at least
is not driven by the subset of households that don￿ t trade at all.
Allowing for slow adjustment to wealth changes￿ The ￿nding that there seems to
be a lot of inertia in households￿portfolio shares brings up the question whether there
might actually be a positive e⁄ect of wealth changes on risky asset shares, just with a
time lag, because households need time to adjust, perhaps because they are trading o⁄
the bene￿ts of rebalancing towards the optimal risky asset share against transaction
costs. In Table 7 we therefore investigate the e⁄ect of wealth changes (between t￿k and
t) on future changes in the risky asset shares (between t and t+k). The control variables
are measured at the same points in time as earlier in Table 4, with the exception of the
preference shifters and the risky asset share, which are moved k periods into the future,
i.e., measured between t and t + k. Regarding sample requirements, we now require
that no assets had been moved out of the household due to a leaving family member,
and marital status remained unchanged between t￿k and t+k, and we require stock
19market participation at t and t + k. Since we need a longer span of data for these
regressions, we have a substantially lower number of observations than in Table 4.
These regressions of ￿k￿t+k on ￿kwt are also interesting from a measurement-error
perspective. The concern in the earlier regressions of ￿k￿t on ￿kwt in Table 4 is
that measurement error in riskless asset holdings (if it dominates relative to the mea-
surement error in risky asset holdings) might induce a spurious negative relationship
between wt and ￿t, and hence also between ￿k￿t and ￿kwt. However, for the regres-
sions in Table 7 the situation is di⁄erent: If measurement error induces a mechanical
negative relationship between wt and ￿t, it should lead to a spurious positive relation-
ship between ￿k￿t+k ￿ ￿t+k ￿ ￿t and ￿kwt ￿ wt ￿ wt￿k. This is easiest to see with
when measurement error is assumed to be uncorrelated over time, but it is also true
with positively autocorrelated measurement error.
As Table 7 shows, the point estimates for the wealth e⁄ect are indeed positive,
and statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst subsample (1984 ￿ 1999) but not in the second
(1999 ￿ 2003). However, in terms of economic magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimates
are again close to zero and not much di⁄erent from those in Table 4. If we take
the maximum coe¢ cient estimate (0:040, column 1) in the table, it suggests that an
increase in liquid wealth by 10% leads to an increase in the risky asset share from 50%
to 50:4%, which strikes us as a small e⁄ect. Moreover, if one was concerned that the
estimates in Table 4 might have a negative measurement error bias, then the estimates
in Table 7 would have positive measurement error bias and would therefore overstate
the e⁄ect of wealth changes.10 Overall, these results suggest that even if we allow for
slow adjustment, there is no evidence for an economically signi￿cant e⁄ect of liquid
wealth changes on risky asset shares.
Big vs. small changes￿ One possible explanation for inertia is that households face
some ￿xed rebalancing cost. In that case, households would only want to rebalance
if the bene￿ts are large enough to outweigh the ￿xed rebalancing cost. From the
perspective of the habit-formation model, this would imply that the household might
be unwilling to rebalance following small wealth changes, but it might do so after big
changes.
To ￿nd out, we examine piecewise-linear regressions, shown in Figure 1. We run
regressions similar to those in Table 4, with the full set of controls (except the asset-
composition controls), and we use a spline for ￿kwt. We set spline breakpoints at the
quartiles of the distribution of ￿kwt. Panel (a) in Figure 1 presents the ￿tted values,
where we express ￿kwt relative to its median and normalize such that the lines cross the
origin. The range of values shown for ￿kwt in the graph is about twice the di⁄erence
between the 75th and 25th percentile. We omit standard errors from the graph, but
10We also estimated the regressions in Table 7 with TSLS. The estimates are close to the OLS
estimates. But due to the lower number of observations, the instruments are now very weak in the
￿rst stage so that the second-stage estimates are not reliable. For this reason, we do not report the
TSLS results.
20none of the slopes in the four segments is more than two standard errors from zero.
As the ￿gure shows, in both the 1984-1999 and the 1999-2003 sample, the relationship
between the liquid risky asset share and changes in liquid wealth is ￿ at for small and
large values of ￿kwt. Hence, there is no support for the view that households might
conform more closely to the predictions of the habit model when wealth changes are
big and hence the bene￿ts from rebalancing towards the optimal portfolio should be
large.
More generally, one can also ask whether households might exhibit less inertia after
big in-/out￿ ows or big capital gains/losses. Again, with ￿xed rebalancing costs house-
holds might be reluctant to rebalance unless the asset allocation has moved su¢ ciently
far away from the optimum. Therefore, Panel (b) in Figure 1 presents a piecewise-
linear version of the regressions in column 1 and 3 of Table 6. Spline breakpoints are
now set at the quartiles of the distribution of ￿kInertt. Everything else, too, is similar
to Panel (a), just with ￿kInertt replacing ￿kwt. Standard errors are again omitted to
reduce clutter, but they are small relative to the point estimates of the slope coe¢ cients
(between 0:06 and 0:13 for the slope coe¢ cients in each of the four segments). The
￿gure shows that inertia is weaker when ￿kInertt is above the 75th percentile, i.e., after
big capital gains or following large out￿ ows. However, inertia is still relatively strong,
and statistically still clearly di⁄erent from zero.
That there is inertia even after big in-/out￿ ows or big capital gains/losses casts
some doubt on the explanation that households are trading o⁄ ￿xed rebalancing costs
against bene￿ts of rebalancing. It seems more likely that households simply do not pay
close attention to their portfolio allocations. In other words, the costs of devoting any
attention to the portfolio may be important, rather than actual costs of transacting.
4 Discussion
Summing up, our evidence shows that the e⁄ect of wealth changes on households￿asset
allocation predicted by di⁄erence-habit models is absent in microdata. The relationship
between wealth and asset allocation seems best described by constant relative risk
aversion. However, the large inertia we ￿nd isn￿ t predicted by constant relative risk
aversion models either￿ at least not without adding frictions.
Our focus in this paper is on understanding the microeconomics of household asset
allocation. But beyond this microeconomic perspective, our results also raise some
questions about models with habit-formation in asset pricing and macroeconomics. In
di⁄erence-habit asset-pricing models, variations in aggregate wealth over the business
cycle generate large low-frequency variation in relative risk aversion and the relative
demands for risky and riskless assets. However, the household-speci￿c variation in
wealth that we see in microdata seems rather large relative to business-cycle varia-
tion, and should therefore generate even larger household-speci￿c variation in relative
21risk aversion and asset allocation. We don￿ t ￿nd this variation in asset allocation in
microdata.
To be clear, we cannot directly test the microeconomic implications of represen-
tative agent models like Campbell and Cochrane (1999) because it is not even clear
how the microfoundations of these models would look like, except for some special
cases with complete markets. However, notwithstanding this lack of explicit micro-
foundations, researchers often view the preferences of the representative agent in these
models as being a plausible representation of the preferences of microeconomic agents.
For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) motivate their choice of habit-formation
preferences by pointing out that they are appealing from a psychological perspective,
and, in particular, that the microeconomic predictions of external habits for consump-
tion are plausible. Our ￿ndings with microdata cast doubt on the plausibility of such
microeconomic stories for time-varying risk aversion.
Our ￿nding that wealth changes have some impact on stock market entry and exit
suggests that changing stock market participation, rather than time-varying individual
risk aversion, could perhaps play a role in the time-variation of risk premia in the
aggregate. Wealth changes can induce changes in stock market participation even with
CRRA preferences, if there are some per-period participation costs. But the e⁄ect we
￿nd does not seem very strong, so it is somewhat questionable whether the magnitudes
are big enough to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect in the aggregate.
Finally, the strong asset allocation inertia we ￿nd is an interesting and, so far, not
well-understood phenomenon.11 At a given point in time, a household￿ s asset allocation
depends to a large extent on the past history of capital gains/losses and in-/out￿ ows.
Part of it may re￿ ect underreporting of risky asset purchases and sales in the PSID, but
we doubt that such measurement error can explain the bulk of the apparent inertia,
not least because similar inertia has also been found with data from 401(k) retirement
accounts that do not have the same measurement error problems. Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988), Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2004),
and Huberman and Sengmueller (2004) ￿nd that a large portion of individuals hardly
ever trade at all in their retirement accounts, and that in￿ ow allocations are rarely
changed.
One explanation could be that individuals are not willing to rebalance their port-
folios because they perceive it as too costly. If so, it seems to be more a cost of giving
any attention at all to the portfolio, rather than a ￿xed rebalancing cost in the form
of explicit transaction costs, because we ￿nd that households are almost as reluctant
to rebalance following large wealth changes as they are after small wealth changes.
In any case, slow adjustment of portfolio shares does not explain the absence of a
11A recent paper by Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2006) explores household characteristics
that are correlated with portfolio inertia. Note that our ￿nding of asset allocation inertia at the
portfolio level is not in contradiction with ￿ndings in Odean (1998) at the individual stock level that
investors tend to sell stocks with good past performance (the disposition e⁄ect).
22wealth e⁄ect on risky asset shares in our data, because wealth changes do not have an
economically signi￿cant e⁄ect on future changes in risky asset shares either.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean 10th pct. Median 90th pct. N
All Households, 1984 - 1999 (k = 5 years)
Liquid wealth 156,391 480 52,532 349,116 3,313
Financial wealth 430,238 26,728 184,756 830,154 3,313
Income 92,515 24,367 72,760 160,369 3,319
Stock mkt. particip. 0.45 0 0 1 3,319
Stock mkt. entry 0.35 0 0 1 1,408
Stock mkt. exit 0.24 0 0 1 1,909
All Households, 1999 - 2003 (k = 2 years)
Liquid wealth 201,783 1,003 62,936 399,129 3,035
Financial wealth 479,317 24,989 202,029 890,536 3,035
Income 99,665 26,884 76,397 172,540 3,033
Stock mkt. particip. 0.58 0 1 1 3,035
Stock mkt. entry 0.34 0 0 1 888
Stock mkt. exit 0.19 0 0 1 2,147
Stock Market Participants, 1984 - 1999 (k = 5 years)
Liquid wealth 269,609 19,137 101,827 576,663 1,439
Financial wealth 630,488 71,442 286,508 1,155,371 1,439
Income 118,502 37,917 90,570 196,475 1,439
￿k log liq. wealth 0.36 -0.98 0.47 1.62 1,399
￿k log ￿n. wealth 0.30 -0.53 0.29 1.16 1,429
￿k log income 0.05 -0.52 0.09 0.60 1,439
%liq. assets risky 0.56 0.13 0.57 0.95 1,439
%￿n. wealth risky 0.74 0.36 0.78 0.99 1,438
￿k %liq. assets risky 0.09 -0.37 0.06 0.59 1,439
￿k %￿n. wealth risky 0.05 -0.30 0.03 0.41 1,438
Stock Market Participants, 1999 - 2003 (k = 2 years)
Liquid wealth 294,622 16,904 110,980 550,204 1,710
Financial wealth 640,382 63,540 296,664 556,920 1,710
Income 116,432 34,000 90,126 198,552 1,710
￿k log liq. wealth -0.04 -1.29 -0.02 1.24 1,654
￿k log ￿n. wealth 0.09 -0.74 0.10 0.88 1,694
￿k log income -0.09 -0.62 0.00 0.39 1,710
%liq. assets risky 0.58 0.17 0.59 0.96 1,710
%￿n. wealth risky 0.75 0.39 0.81 0.99 1,710
￿k %liq. assets risky -0.02 -0.46 -0.01 0.40 1,710
￿k %￿n. wealth risky 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.33 1,710
27Table 2: Changes in Liquid Wealth and Stock Market Entry and Exit: Probit Regres-
sions
Entry Exit
k = 5 k = 2 k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003) (1984-1999) (1999-2003)
￿k log liq. wealtht 0.124 0.108 -0.058 -0.072
(0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007)
￿2 log incomet￿k 0.048 0.019 -0.051 -0.034
(0.032) (0.035) (0.021) (0.015)
￿2 log incomet￿k￿2 0.009 0.004 -0.024 -0.020
(0.024) (0.026) (0.018) (0.011)
Log incomet￿k￿4 0.203 0.122 -0.097 -0.044
(0.039) (0.040) (0.023) (0.014)
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.19
N 971 607 1,556 1,724
Notes: Estimates are marginal e⁄ects evaluated at sample averages of the explana-
tory variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
28Table 3: First Stage Regressions
￿k log liq. wealtht ￿k log ￿n. wealtht
k = 5 k = 2 k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003) (1984-1999) (1999-2003)
Instruments:
I(￿k log incomet < 10th pct.) -0.211 -0.110 -0.217 -0.116
(0.131) (0.093) (0.093) (0.073)
I(￿k log incomet > 90th pct.) 0.480 0.098 0.257 0.062
(0.121) (0.082) (0.082) (0.067)
Inheritancet 0.290 0.559 0.111 0.417
(0.160) (0.174) (0.082) (0.104)
Controls:
￿2 log incomet￿k 0.165 0.087 0.077 0.033
(0.101) (0.057) (0.048) (0.046)
￿2 log incomet￿k￿2 0.141 0.092 0.085 0.033
(0.120) (0.043) (0.043) (0.029)
Log incomet￿k￿4 0.133 0.068 0.040 0.014
(0.102) (0.042) (0.045) (0.031)
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Partial R2 of instruments 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
F-test of instruments 8.39 5.09 6.19 7.41
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
N 1,234 1,455 1,258 1,489
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
29Table 4: Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in Risky Assets
k = 5 (1984-1999) k = 2 (1999-2003)
OLS OLS TSLS OLS OLS TSLS
￿k log liquid wealtht -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 0.023 0.017 -0.136
(0.007) (0.009) (0.058) (0.011) (0.015) (0.076)
Asset composition controls Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj.R2 0.01 0.01 ￿ 0.01 0.02 ￿
Overidenti￿cation test ￿ ￿ [0.41] ￿ ￿ [0.64]
N 1,234 1,234 1,234 1,455 1,455 1,455
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses, p-values in brackets.
30Table 5: Changes in the Proportion of Financial Wealth Invested in Risky Assets
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
OLS OLS TSLS OLS OLS TSLS
￿k log ￿nancial wealtht -0.160 -0.172 -0.198 -0.108 -0.103 -0.355
(0.059) (0.091) (0.090) (0.031) (0.036) (0.130)
Asset composition controls Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.11 0.11 ￿ 0.06 0.06 ￿
Overidenti￿cation test ￿ ￿ [0.56] ￿ ￿ [0.57]
N 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,489 1,489 1,489
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses, p-values in brackets.
31Table 6: E⁄ects of Inertia on Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in
Risky Assets, OLS
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
￿k log liq.wealtht -0.061 0.000 -0.003 -0.167 0.005 -0.001
(0.025) (0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006) (0.002)
￿k log liq.wealtht ￿ Tradet 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.010)
Risky asset returnt 0.151 0.227
(0.012) (0.013)
￿kInertt 0.743 1.002 0.754 1.004
(0.027) (0.010) (0.054) (0.006)




Preference shifters Y Y Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj.R2 0.34 0.64 0.70 0.57 0.72 0.76
N 1,042 1,080 1,080 1,308 1,325 1,325
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
32Table 7: Future Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in Risky Assets:
￿k￿t+k as Dependent Variable, OLS
k = 5 (1984-1999) k = 2 (1999-2003)
￿k log liquid wealtht 0.040 0.037 0.006 0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Asset composition controls Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Adj.R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
N 561 561 597 597
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Piecewise-Linear Regression of Changes in the Liquid Risky Asset Share on
Changes in Liquid Wealth (a), and on the Inertia Variable (b).
Notes: In addition to the spline terms for ￿kwt or ￿kInertt, the regressions also
contain the full set of control variables (Life-cycle controls, preference shifters, and
year-region FE, as in Table 4). Spline breakpoints are set at quartiles for ￿kwt or
￿kInertt, respectively. For the plot, we express ￿kwt and ￿kInertt relative to their
medians. Control variables are held ￿xed as we vary ￿kwt and ￿kInertt. The ￿gure
presents ￿tted values normalized such that the lines cross the orgin.
34APPENDIX
A.1 Model with Internal Habit
The analysis in Section 2.1 can easily be extended to models with internal habit, where
the habit depends on past consumption as in Constantinides (1990) in a continuous-
time setting. Speci￿cally, let the habit, Xt, follow the di⁄erence equation:




t ￿ (Ct ￿ Xt)
Rf + a





t ￿ Wt ￿ (1 + Rf)
Xt
Rf ￿ b + a
. (A.3)
W ￿
t re￿ ects the excess wealth that is not needed to ￿nance future discounted habit,
where the habit grows at a rate of b and depreciates at a rate of a. Note that the
value of Xt+1 is known at time t. Now assume that the investor at time t invests,
after time t consumption, a fraction ￿￿
t of wealth in excess of
Xt+1
Rf￿b+a into the risky
asset, and the rest in the riskless asset. This surplus portfolio yields a return R￿
p;t+1
￿ ￿￿
t (Rt ￿ Rf) + Rf. The remaining
Xt+1
Rf￿b+a dollars are invested in the riskless asset.







(Wt ￿ Ct ￿
Xt+1
Rf ￿ b + a
) + (1 + Rf)
Xt+1
Rf ￿ b + a
. (A.4)
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(Wt ￿ Ct)(Rf + a ￿ b)
￿
: (A.8)
35Approximating ￿￿ ￿ 1, as in the main text, we get
￿t = 1 ￿
Xt+1
(Wt ￿ Ct)(Rf + a ￿ b)
: (A.9)
Log-linearizing and, in an abuse of notation, slightly changing our de￿nitions to xt ￿
log(Xt=(Rf + a ￿ b)), wt ￿ log(Wt ￿ Ct), we have
￿t = 1 ￿ exp(xt+1 ￿ wt) (A.10)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(xt+1 ￿ wt); (A.11)
which implies
￿￿t = ￿￿￿xt+1 + ￿￿wt: (A.12)
Note that ￿xt+1 = ￿log(Xt+1) = log(1 + bCt ￿ aXt). Therefore, as long as b and a
are close to zero, which means that the habit reacts sluggishly to past consumption,
we can approximate
￿￿t ￿ ￿￿wt: (A.13)
as we do in Section 2.2. Of course, if the habit reacts faster, then it is possible that
the e⁄ects of ￿xt+1 and ￿wt o⁄set, and our tests don￿ t pick up the time-varying risk
aversion induced by the habit. So our tests should be viewed as tests for low frequency
movements in relative risk aversion.
A.2 Numerical Solution of a Model with Antici-
pated Income
To illustrate the e⁄ects of anticipated income on portfolio choice, we numerically solve
a three-period version of our model, in which the household receives, with some positive
probability, a large payment (e.g., an inheritance) in the second period. The household
starts with an initial wealth of W0 = 50 in liquid assets and chooses consumption (C1,
C2) and the risky asset share (￿1, ￿2) at time t = 1;2. For simplicity, the household is
assumed to have no labor income or other assets. At t = 3, the household is assumed
to consume the entire remaining wealth. At t = 2, the household receives a payment B,
with probability pB = 0:8. Hence, the expected value of this payment to the household
at t = 1 is E1 [B] = pBB. We further set log(1 + Rt) ￿ N (￿;￿2), log(1 + Rf) = 0:04,
￿ = 0:09, ￿ = 0:15, ￿ = 4, and ￿ = 0:9.
We solve the model by backward induction using a standard approach. We ￿rst
solve the second period problem as a function of beginning of second period wealth. For
a given level of beginning of second period wealth (before second period consumption
but after returns from the ￿rst to the second period are realized), we perform a grid
search over values of C2 and ￿2 to ￿nd the combination that maximizes expected utility,
36where we use numerical integration to evaluate expected utility. In this way we obtain
maximized expected utility, i.e., the value function, as a function of beginning of second
period wealth on a discretely spaced grid. We interpolate the value function between
grid points and then solve the ￿rst period problem to obtain the optimal C1 and ￿1.
Figure A.1 shows how consumption and the risky asset share chosen in the ￿rst
period depend on the expected value of the second period payment. We consider
values for B from 0 to 50, i.e., E1 [B] ranges from 0 to 40. At the higher end of this
range, the payment, if received, substantially raises the liquid assets of the household
(compared with W0 = 50), and this increase is largely anticipated since pB = 0:8￿ just
like it might be the case for the typical inheritance. Panel (a) shows that the risky
asset share of a household with habit (X = 10) does not signi￿cantly increase as we
increase B. Despite the fact that the household anticipates a substantial asset in￿ ow
in the second period, this does not induce the household to increase the allocation to
risky asset. The reason is￿ as we discuss in the main part of the paper￿ that the small,
but non-negligible risk that B will be zero forces the household to still save enough in
riskless assets to be able to self-insure future habit. A likely, but not entirely certain
payment in the second period cannot be utilized for insuring future habit, and therefore
does not signi￿cantly increase the household￿ s willingness to hold the risky asset. In
fact, there is actually a small decline in the risky asset share with higher B. This
e⁄ect has to do with the household￿ s consumption decision. As Panel (b) shows, and
as one would expect, the anticipation of a large payment raises consumption in the
￿rst period, which in turn implies that less liquid assets are available to insure future
habit, and so a higher proportion of those liquid assets must be invested in the riskless
asset.
For comparison, Panels (a) and (b) also show the optimal consumption and risky
asset share of a household without habit (X = 0). As one would expect, the promise of
a large payment raises the willingness of a CRRA household to hold risky assets in the
￿rst period, because the risky in￿ ow in the second period provides some diversi￿cation
of the risk associated with the risky asset, akin to the e⁄ect of risky, uncorrelated labor
income.
Panels (c) and (d) plot ￿￿2 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿1 against the change in the log of liquid
assets ￿w2 = w2 ￿ w1, comparable to the variables that we measure in the empirical
data, for several values of B. It is apparent that the risky asset share of a household
with habit utility strongly responds to changes in the level of liquid assets (Panel (c)),
while the risky asset share of a household with CRRA utility does not (Panel (d)).
Most importantly, with habit utility the relationship is almost identical, irrespective
of whether changes in the level of liquid assets are unexpected (E1 [B] = 0) or a
large increase is anticipated (B = 50, E1 [B] = 40). Overall, the results from this
model support our intuitive argument in Section 2.2 of the paper that the e⁄ects of
unexpected and anticipated changes in liquid asset holdings on the risky asset share
should be similar.
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Figure A.1: Numerical Solutions of Three-Period Model
A.3 Estimation in the Presence of Aggregate Shocks
Chamberlain (1984) points out that when households are subject to common aggregate
shocks, the fact that a model implies that the time-series average of shocks converges
to zero as T ! 1 (a typical implication of rational expectations models), does not
imply that the cross-sectional average must go to zero as the number of cross-sectional
units N ! 1. If the shock is identical across the population, then including time dum-
mies absorbs the common shock. But if di⁄erent groups of households have di⁄erent
sensitivity to the common shock, there is again no guarantee that the time dummies
eliminate the common shock. Hence, estimation with cross-sectional moments may
lead to biased coe¢ cients. In our setting, however, this issue does not arise. To show
this, we closely follow Deaton (1992), p. 148. Assume that household i￿ s log wealth
is subject to an aggregate shock ￿t with household-speci￿c sensitivity (1 + ￿i) and an
idiosyncratic shock (uncorrelated across households) ￿it, so that
38￿wit = ￿t + ￿i￿t + ￿it; (A.14)
where the cross-sectional average of ￿i is zero. Our model implies that the change in
the risky asset share follows
￿￿t = ￿(￿i￿t + ￿it) + ￿￿￿t; 0 < ￿ < 1; (A.15)
where the coe¢ cient on the aggregate shock is lower by the factor ￿, because ￿t implies
a change in the aggregate demand for stocks which leads to a change in prices and
expected returns, not to a change in the quantity of stocks held (holding the supply
of stocks ￿xed). Now suppose we run a single cross-sectional regression, with intercept
(i.e., a time dummy), of ￿￿t on ￿wit. It is easy to show that the OLS estimator for




￿V ar(￿i￿t + ￿it)
V ar(￿i￿t + ￿it)
= ￿; (A.16)
where V ar(:) denotes the cross-sectional variance. Thus, we can consistently estimate
￿ by including time-dummies in our panel regressions.
The reason that the Chamberlain (1984) problem does not arise in our setting is
that dependent and explanatory variable are contemporaneous. As a consequence,
the e⁄ects of ￿i￿t in the dependent and explanatory variable cancel out in numerator
and denominator of plim b ￿. In contrast, the examples discussed by Deaton (1992), p.
146-148, are ones where consumption growth is regressed on lagged income growth.
One issue that may complicate things is if ￿ is also heterogeneous in the population
and is correlated with ￿i. Then it no longer drops out completely through the time
dummy. With ￿￿t as the LHS variable, ￿ should have some heterogeneity, because
a given percentage change in stock prices due to the aggregate shock should have a
bigger e⁄ect for households with high ￿t than for those with low ￿t. However, we
can also linearize Eq. (8) di⁄erently so that ￿log￿t is on the LHS. In that case, the
e⁄ect of a given percentage change in prices on ￿log￿t would be the same for all
households (assuming the composition of their risky asset portfolios is similar). We
report regressions with ￿log￿t in Table A.2 in this Appendix. They yield similar
results compared with those that have ￿￿t as the dependent variable, which suggests
that heterogeneity in ￿ does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on our results.
A.4 Data: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
We now provide additional details about our data from the PSID and variable con-
struction. Whenever possible, we use the Wealth Supplement Files and the Income
Plus Files to construct our variables, and the Core Family Files otherwise. Annual
39sample sizes in the PSID range from 5,000 to 7,000, but they are signi￿cantly reduced
by the data availability requirements we impose.
In terms of timing, wealth data is reported as of the time the interview takes place
(e.g., some time during 2003 in the 2003 wave), while income data refer to the calendar
year preceding the date of the interview. Hence, the income and wealth data are not
perfectly aligned, but for our tests this does not constitute a problem, because we focus
on the relationship of di⁄erent wealth variables which are all measured at the same
date for a given household.
Riskless assets comprise the PSID categories cash (checking and savings accounts,
money market funds, certi￿cates of deposits, savings bonds, and treasury bills) plus
bonds and life insurance (bonds, bond funds, cash value in a life insurance, valuable
collection for investment purposes, and rights in a trust or estate). Risky liquid assets
are de￿ned as the amount reported in the PSID survey question asking for the combined
value of shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, and investment
trusts. In the PSID, subjects are asked to report securities holdings net of amounts
owed on the position. Other debts comprise items such as credit card debt, student
loans, medical or legal bills, and loans from relatives. Home equity is the value of the
home minus remaining mortgage principal.
Before 1999, subjects were asked explicitly to include assets held in individual
retirement accounts (IRA) when reporting their ￿nancial asset holdings. Since 1999,
they are asked to exclude assets in employer-based pensions and IRAs. Instead, there
is a separate question on the value of IRA assets and their allocation to di⁄erent asset
classes. Based on the answer to the latter question, we allocate the IRA assets to
stocks and bonds. If subjects state ￿mostly stocks￿we allocate 100% of the IRA value
to stocks, if the answer is ￿split￿we allocate 50% to stocks and 50% to bonds, if it
says ￿mostly interest bearing￿we put 100% to bonds.
When we use data on purchases and sales of risky assets to back out capital gains
and losses, we need to make an assumption regarding the timing of investment. The
reported investment could either have occurred early or late in the measurement period.
We assume that half of it has been made at the beginning of the period, and half of
it at the end. For IRA assets in 1999, 2001, and 2003 we only have a combined active
investment ￿gure for all IRA assets. As an approximation, we assume that new IRA
funds are allocated pro rata among the prior holdings.
A.5 Robustness Checks
Correction for weak instruments￿ In our TSLS regressions, our instruments are highly
signi￿cant in the ￿rst-stage regression, but comparing the ￿rst stage F-statistic for the
test that the coe¢ cients on the instruments are jointly zero with the results of Stock and
Yogo (2005) nevertheless suggests that we cannot reject with high con￿dence that the
40TSLS estimator could have some bias and the test statistics could have size distortions.
For this reason, we re-run our tests with a limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) estimator and compute coverage-corrected con￿dence intervals along the lines
proposed by Moreira (2003). Table (A.1) presents the results. The point estimate
shown is the LIML estimate and the coverage-corrected 95% con￿dence interval is
shown in brackets. In Speci￿cation (1) the dependent variable is the change in the
proportion of risky assets in liquid wealth, and in Speci￿cation (2) the dependent
variable is the change in the proportion of risky assets in ￿nancial wealth. Comparing
the results with Tables 4 and 5, it is apparent that the LIML estimator produces results
that are almost identical to those with the TSLS estimator. The only di⁄erence is that
the coverage-corrected con￿dence intervals are slightly wider than the TSLS con￿dence
intervals based on the usual normal approximation. Overall, our TSLS results do not
seem to be much a⁄ected by a weak-instruments problem.
Table A.1: LIML estimates and coverage-corrected Moreira (2003) con￿dence intervals
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
￿k log liquid wealtht -0.012 -0.143
[-0.178, 0.154] [-0.433, 0.020]
￿k log ￿nancial wealtht -0.199 -0.382
[-0.460, 0.040] [-0.770, -0.149]
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
N 1,234 1,258 1,455 1,489
Transformations of the risky asset share￿ In Section (2.2), we linearized the rela-
tionship between the risky asset share and liquid wealth. Our linearization is not the
only way in which one could linearize the relationship. For example, one could linearize
in such a way that the dependent variable on the left-hand size of Equation (9) is the
k-period di⁄erence of some transformation of the risky asset share. Here we consider
the log and logit transformations and we check whether we obtain similar results if we
use the k-period di⁄erence in the log risky asset share (Speci￿cation (1) in Table A.2)
or logit risky asset share (Speci￿cation (2) in Table A.2) as the dependent variable in
our regressions. As the table shows, we still obtain a slighly negative coe¢ cient, as in
Table 4, between two and three standard errors from zero. In addition, Speci￿cation
(3) uses as the dependent variable a risky asset share that accounts for leverage. In-
stead of scaling stock holdings by the amount of liquid assets, we scale by liquid wealth
(liquid assets minus non-mortgage debt, such as credit card debt, for example). As a
result, the risky asset share can be bigger than one. Because there are some households
41with liquid wealth close to zero or negative at time t, we have to discard observations
with negative liquid wealth and we winsorize values of the risky asset share above 2.
In the main part of the paper, we scale by liquid assets to avoid such truncation and
winsorizing, but as Table A.2 shows the OLS results are very similar when we scale
by liquid wealth instead of liquid assets. The coe¢ cient on ￿k log liquid wealth is
signi￿cantly negative in the 1984-1999 sample period. Only for Speci￿cation (2) in the
in the 1999-2003 subsample, the coe¢ cient is higher than in our basic Speci￿cation in
Table 4. For all three Speci￿cations in Table A.2 we also re-ran our TSLS regressions
with the risky asset share transformations and obtained similar results. Overall, the
results are not systematically di⁄erent if we choose a di⁄erent linearization or take into
account leverage.
Table A.2: Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in Risky Assets: Trans-
formations of the risky asset share
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1984-1999)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
￿k log liquid wealtht -0.061 -0.077 -0.063 0.017 0.144 -0.089
(0.023) (0.038) (0.010) (0.036) (0.069) (0.034)
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02
N 1,234 1,234 1,234 1,455 1,455 1,455
One might suspect that the log transformation could have a stronger e⁄ect on the
regressions that use changes in the proportion of ￿nancial wealth invested in risky
asset, because the ￿nancial wealth risky asset share has some negative skewness, with
observations being somewhat concentrated close to one (see Table 1). However, as
Table A.3 shows, the transformations make little di⁄erence. The point estimates using
the log transformation (Speci￿cation 1) and the logit transformation (Speci￿cation 2)
are again negative, as in Table 5. Note that the logit transformation yields a lower
number of observations here, because it excludes households with more than 100%
invested in risky assets. Recall that the denominator of the risky asset share in this
case is ￿nancial wealth (unlike the liquid assets risky asset share, which has liquid
assets, not liquid wealth, as the denominator), which can be smaller than the amount
of risky ￿nancial assets. In summary, these tests con￿rm that our results are robust to
choosing a di⁄erent linearization of our estimating equation.
Sampling weights￿ Our tests in the main part of the paper weight all observations
equally (except for the summary statistics in Table 1), despite the fact that households
with di⁄erent characteristics have di⁄erent sampling probabilities in the PSID. The
42Table A.3: Changes in the Proportion of Financial Assets Invested in Risky Assets:
Transformations of the risky asset share
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
￿k log ￿nancial wealtht -0.225 -0.362 -0.165 -0.140
(0.036) (0.097) (0.037) (0.099)
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.04
N 1,254 1,142 1,487 1,303
reason is that our model should apply to all households. Hence, for estimating habit
e⁄ects it would be ine¢ cient to use sample weights (see, e.g., the discussion in Deaton
(1997), p. 70). If some household characteristics need to be controlled for, we do so by
including them in the regression. But it turns out that we also obtain similar results
if we weight households by the PSID sample weights, as shown in Table A.4.
Table A.4: Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in Risky Assets:
Weighted with Sampling Weights
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
OLS OLS TSLS OLS OLS TSLS
￿k log liquid wealtht -0.015 -0.010 0.024 0.027 0.021 -0.108
(0.007) (0.008) (0.065) (0.011) (0.015) (0.066)
Asset composition controls Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 ￿ 0.01 0.02 ￿
N 1,234 1,234 1,234 1,455 1,455 1,455
The results are almost identical to those in Table 4. The same is true for the regres-
sions with the proportion of ￿nancial wealth invested in risky assets (not tabulated).
LAD regressions￿ To check whether our results might be driven by outliers, we
run least-absolute deviation (LAD) regressions (median regressions). The results are
shown in Table A.5, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. It is apparent that
the estimates are virtually identical to our OLS estimates. Therefore, we conclude that
our results are not driven by outliers.
43Table A.5: Changes in the Proportion of Liquid Assets Invested in Risky Assets: Me-
dian regressions
k = 5 k = 2
(1984-1999) (1999-2003)
￿k log liquid wealtht -0.010 -0.009 0.022 0.016
(0.015) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013)
Asset composition controls Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
N 1,234 1,234 1,455 1,455
44